The Emperor of Constantinople, sicuro oppose his neighbours http://www.datingranking.net/it/maiotaku-review/, sent ten thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece onesto the infidels.
Therefore, let him who has no desire puro conquer make use of these arms, for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because with them the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield obedience sicuro others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered, more time and better opportunities are needed esatto injure you; they are not all of one community, they are found and paid by you, and a third ricevimento, which you have made their head, is not able all at once onesto assure enough authority preciso injure you. The wise prince, therefore, has always avoided these arms and turned preciso his own; and has been willing rather preciso lose with them than esatto conquer with the others, not deeming that verso real victory which is gained with the arms of others.
Hence it arises that the French cannot stand against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not che off well against others
I shall never hesitate onesto cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This duke entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards, such forces not appearing sicuro him reliable, he turned sicuro mercenaries, discerning less danger sopra them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli; whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and dangerous, he destroyed and turned onesto his own men. And the difference between one and the other of these forces can easily be seen when one considers the difference there was per the reputation of the duke, when he had the French, when he had the Orsini and Vitelli, and when he relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity he could always count and found it ever increasing; he was never esteemed more highly than when every one saw that he was complete specializzazione of his own forces.
And this example proves it, for the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained
I was not intending onesto go beyond Italian and recent examples, but I am unwilling esatto leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of those I have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the army by the Syracusans, soon found out that per mercenary soldiery, constituted like our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it appearing preciso him that he could neither keep them not let them go, he had them all cut esatto pieces, and afterwards made war with his own forces and not with aliens.
I wish also onesto recall onesto memory an instance from the Old Testament applicable to this subject. David offered himself onesto Saul to fight with Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage, Saul armed him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as he had them on his back, saying he could make giammai use of them, and that he wished puro meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In conclusion, the arms of others either fall from your back, or they weigh you down, or they bind you fast.
Charles the Seventh, the father of King Louis the Eleventh, having by good fortune and valour liberated France from the English, recognized the necessity of being armed with forces of his own, and he established mediante his kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infantry. Afterwards his bourdonnement, King Louis, abolished the infantry and began to enlist the Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as is now seen, per source of peril sicuro that kingdom; because, having raised the reputation of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of his own arms, for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his men-at-arms he has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so accustomed esatto fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that they can now conquer without them. The armies of the French have thus become mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms together are much better than mercenaries aureola or auxiliaries macchia, but much inferior puro one’s own forces.